Resources

This study of California focuses on (1) vote-by-mail signature verification processes and (2) notice and remedy procedures for unverified signatures.

This research tests four explanations for how vote by mail voters choose to return their ballot, including the social rewards of voting, the costs of voting, trust in U.S. Postal Service and a preference to cast a ballot after campaigning ends. It finds supporting evidence for each explanation conditioned by prior history of voting.

The research finds that online voter registration systems in some states have vulnerabilities that allow adversaries to alter or effectively prevent a voter's registration. The analysis additionally finds that ballot tracking systems raise serious privacy questions surrounding ease of access to voter data.

The research finds that drop boxes have a positive effect on voter turnout and that decreasing the distance to these boxes can lead to an increased likelihood of voting.

In this paper, authors argue that risk limiting audits can verify tabulation of paper records but cannot by themselves ensure ballot marking device printouts reflect voter intent if voters do not verify them.

Authors collect data from 1996-2018 on all three U.S. states who implemented universal vote-by-mail in a staggered fashion across counties, allowing us to use a difference-in-differences design at the county level to estimate causal effects. They find that: (1) universal vote-by-mail does not appear to affect either party's share of turnout; (2) universal vote-by-mail does not appear to increase either party's vote share; and (3) universal vote-by-mail modestly increases overall average turnout rates, in line with previous estimates.

Since the passage of the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment of 2009, many technology solutions have been developed to help UOCAVA voters request, receive and return their ballots. This report examines the preliminary and current landscape of these technology solutions and identifies barriers to ensuring their sustainability. The report also identifies areas of further research related to emerging UOCAVA balloting solutions.

In this report, Morrell guides jurisdictions through planning and conducting risk limiting audits pilots, including stakeholder preparation, logistics, and post-pilot evaluation.

Verified Voting maintains and publicly available, searchable database documenting state laws, regulations, and procedures for post-election audits across U.S. jurisdictions.

In this resource, Verified Voting explains why post-election audits of paper ballots provide evidence for election outcomes and opportunities to correct outcomes when needed.

This report evaluates possible risk limiting audit (RLA) methods for Rhode Island's statutory RLA program and recommends practical implementation approaches.

This report provides a step-by-step workbook for officials planning and conducting a ballot-comparison risk limiting audits, including planning templates and operational considerations.